1715.1	
	25X1

29

EASTERN EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCER

OCI #0686/68 7 February 1968

FRG Initiative on Oder-Neisse Reportedly Imminent

Bonn's Foreign Office Polish Desk officer Arz told US officials on 6 February that, barring any last minute changes in tactics, Chancellor Kiesinger intends to ask De Gaulle to tell the Poles that the FRG is prepared to "sit down" and "discuss" the Oder-Neisse question with them whenever they like.

Arz said that the FRG position that a final border settlement can only come in a peace treaty does not preclude joint steps toward solutions of outstanding questions before such a treaty is signed. He thought the FRG might be prepared to make a declaration committing itself on the Oder-Neisse question at any such future conference, if this would clearly lead to a resumption of Polish-FRG relations.

Arz was skeptical whether the Soviets, in view of the predictably sharp GDR opposition, would agree to Warsaw's entering into such talks, and believed that the initiatives would, therefore, only mark the beginning of a lengthy softening-up process.

25X1

COMMENT: The question of the Oder-Neisse boundary is at the core of Polish foreign policy, and has had a direct bearing on the year-long Polish-East German-Soviet efforts to forge a common Eastern European response to the FRG's eastern policy. Whatever the Polish response to the FRG initiative on this question, therefore, the Bonn move would at minimum have a divisive impact on the Eastern European regimes.

Although there have been several unconfirmed reports recently that the Polish position on Germany has "softened" as a result of Soviet urgings and because of the resumption of FRG-Yugoslav relations, the initial Polish reaction to the proposed FRG Oder-Neisse initiative will be negative. (see following item) At the very least, the Gomulka regime will claim that the FRG has no competence to open talks about frontiers between two other sovereign states, one of which, the GDR, it fails to recognize. Expected East German pressure against Warsaw's responsiveness to the initiative will probably tend to strain Polish-East German relations. Despite Warsaw's outward rigid position in support of its GDR ally, there is evidence that the Poles have never put all their eggs in the East German basket.

GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

SECRET

25X1

-2-

The proposed FRG initiative will also have a further divisive impact on the Polish party, where factional infighting is again at a high point. Criticism of the leadership's rigid German policy is one of the main issues already contributing to this turmoil.

Polish Reaction to FRG-Yugoslav Diplomatic Tie

The renewal of FRG-Yugoslav diplomatic relations was front-paged by the main party daily, <u>Trybuna Ludu</u>, on 1 February. The report, however, singled out those passages from the Yugoslav announcement which stressed the original reasons for Bonn's breaking relations in 1957, and which stated that Yugoslavia will maintain and develop relations with East Germany.

Warsaw's non-party daily Zycie Warszawy on 2 February made more twists and turns. Arguing at first that the FRG-Yugoslav move was only "formal," the paper then hailed it as a major step toward Bonn's recognition of the existence of two German states. The commentary asserted that the move was, nevertheless, only a "tactical correction" to the main "anti-peace current" of Bonn's policy, but admitted that the FRG had created a "change of climate." It concluded, however, that no such change "can replace the necessity of FRG acceptance of basic conditions for the normalization of relations with Poland, namely recognition of the border, recognition of the GDR, and renunciation of nuclear arms."

COMMENT: These twists are perhaps the best indication that the Poles have not yet decided what line to take. A Trybuna Ludu editor told US Embassy officers recently that the FRG-Yugoslav move was far more important than the establishment of Rumanian-West German relations last year, and that it would "help unfreeze the Polish position." Notably, when party boss Gomulka obliquely critized the Rumanian move last year, he gratuitously added that had Bonn's overtures been directed at Belgrade instead of Bucharest, it would have been considerably more important in terms of West German-Eastern European relations.

Hungarian Reaction to Bonn-Belgrade Recognition is Noncommittal

Hungary's public reaction to the recent resumption of relations between the FRG and Yugoslavia has, so far, been limited to summarizing other Eastern European press reactions and has avoided any original commentary. The Embassy does not

SECRET

	d for Release 2011/02/			2
	_	.3-		
think that the agreement to a	Yugoslav exampl similar move by	e "will sig the Hungar	nificantly speed ian government."	
COMMENT: firm indicatio agreement.	The Hungarians ns of Soviet thi	are probabl	y waiting for some e Bonn-Belgrade	e
Gromyko's Bulg	arian Visit Cance	elled		
A Bulgari	an Telegraph Age	ency (BTA) i n Minister O	tem of 6 February Fromyko's February Jours later by BTA	VISIU-
when he was pa a visit was co Moscow's posit with Rumania, and relations visit to Havar of Gromyko's v	ort of a party-go considered at this cions on the rene the upcoming Bud with Cuba follow	overnment destime to consume the dapest consuming the caron surroundincellation of the consume the caron surrounds	Friendship treating, and the stream of the s	s d es kev's nt
Bulgaria Prote	sts Criminal Cas	es_		
about the their threatened ray attache and of The latest inconstruction chauffeur attawas handcuffed burglary suspend held more because his carried police derivatives.	ft of its Embass; pe of the wife of the wife of the wife of the relation of the Buld and searched bect. The chauff than five minuter with diploma	y nameplate f the Bulgar lations of on 2 Februar garian tradey New York's eur, who was es, but the tic plates, car and the	in Sofia and Washi, the robbery and rian assistant mildiplomatic immunitry when the Bulgare mission in New Yes finest as a possion his cups, was Bulgarians are in was also searched US had expressed	itary y vian Tork sible s nconsec

NOTE: THE VIEWS EXPRESSED ABOVE REPRESENT ONLY THE ANALYSIS OF THE EE DIVISION

25X1

SECRET